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Of Crime-And Punishment: Sentencing the
White-Collar Criminal
Alfred S. Pelaez*
I. INTRODUCTION
Move over all you thugs with primed Saturday night specials. A
new whipping boy, the white-collar criminal, has appeared on the
horizon and seems destined to share a large portion of the law enforce-
ment heat.
Perhaps that is as it should be. The most notorious street criminals
did not approach white-collar criminals in either the magnitude of their
crimes, or the human carnage left in their wakes.' Thus, it is high time
* Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. Professor Pelaez is the
Vice-Chairman of the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing.
1. Incidences of "computer criminals" siphoning off hundreds of thousands and even
millions of dollars of corporate funds are surfacing with increasing frequency, even though
it is widely rumored that most such crime goes unreported because of institutional embar-
rassment and the fear that publicity will trigger yet more of these difficult-to-detect
crimes. The complex, interlocking corporate structures of our large businesses, and the
storage of critical information on easily alterable magnetic discs, make detection of even
staggeringly large losses difficult and prosecution and conviction arduous.
The recent Ford Motor Company suit involving alleged suppression of information
disclosing the hazards of the Pinto automobile, the Buffalo Creek disaster where more
than 125 people died as a result of a mining company's use of an illegal earthen dam, and
the Love Canal incident involving the burial of toxic waste material adjacent to a subur-
ban development, disclose how corporate activities in covering up known defects can
result in more deaths than those caused by our most notorious mass murderers. It is
probable that scores of defects in items ranging from can openers to airplanes have been
spotted during the design and early production stages and such information suppressed
for economic reasons, resulting in a great deal of human injury and death; and that
thousands of persons have continued to be exposed to known lethal work and environmen-
tal conditions deemed too expensive to remedy. If these acts are criminal in the legal
sense, some of our great industrial institutions seem destined to replace Jack the Ripper
and the Boston Strangler in lurid criminal lore.
In one recent study, extensive statistical evidence is cited as support for the conclu-
sion that "although the criminal justice system largely ignores business crime, the direct
short-term economic impact of this type of crime is at least ten times greater than that at-
tributable to 'street crimes' against property, and it frequently results in serious bodily
harm." Harris & Dunbaugh, Premise for a Sensible Sentencing Debate: Giving Up Im-
prisonment, 7 HOPSTRA L. REV. 417, 437 (1978). See also Ogren, The Ineffectiveness of the
Criminal Sanction in Fraud and Corruption Cases: Losing the Battle Against White-
Collar Crime, 11 AM. CR1M. L. REv. 959, 965 (1973) ("Some white-collar crimes may be more
vicious, calculated and exploitive than street crimes, which are penalized far more severely")
[hereinafter cited as Ogren].
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we concern ourselves with these crimes, often the most serious and
gross of those committed in any community, and cease pretending that
the duty to make our streets safe to traverse at night is of any greater
importance. But if we are to concentrate efforts toward controlling
white-collar crimes, we must additionally deal with the sentencing of
those convicted of such transgressions. And here, the waters muddy.
The United States Department of Justice, which has until recently
devoted a small percentage of its budget to controlling such crimes,'
has apparently changed direction. It has affirmatively recognized the
threat such crimes pose to our existence and has proposed that the
perpetrators of economic transgressions be dealt with as severely as
all other criminals. Thus, former Attorney General Griffin Bell, in a
widely quoted speech, stated:
We must increase the cost to the offenders of committing such crimes
[white-collar crimes] by ensuring his or her detection, quick prosecution
and punishment more severe than only the possible loss of reputation and
community standing. Imposition of prison sentences joined with ap-
propriate fines should be the rule, with probation and early parole reserved
only for the most exceptional cases.3
His successor has adopted those views, adding that the imposition of
"heavy" prison sentences should be the rule.' In an economy that has
turned suddenly sour, heavy handedness toward those economic
criminals who gouge a share of ever decreasing real incomes is sure to
strike a responsive populist strain. Broad support, however, makes it
no more likely to be- correct than were the previous decades of broad
neglect. If increased penal sanctions are to be imposed upon white-
collar criminals, it must be because doing so fulfills legitimate and pro-
ductive goals of the criminal justice system. There is no indication that
increased use of imprisonment as we today perceive that term will
fulfill those goals.
To deal rationally with the problem of sentencing white-collar
criminals, it is first necessary to ascertain who are the white-collar
2. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, RESOURCES DEVOTED BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO COMBAT WHITE-COLLAR CRIME AND PUBLIC CORRUPTION 2 (1979)
(indicating that 5.1% of the Department of Justice Budget for the fiscal years 1977 and
1978 was spent combating white-collar crime and public corruption). However, more re-
cent statistics as to criminal filings in the federal courts indicates a trend away from the
prosecution of street-type crimes and a heavier emphasis on organized and business-type
crimes. See generally 1979 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR-ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE,
UNITED STATES COURTS; LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, PROSECUTION OF ECONOMIC CRIME (1976).
3. Address by then Attorney General Griffin B. Bell to the United States Chamber
of Commerce Business Advisory Panel on White-Collar Crime, November 30, 1978.
4. The comments were made by the present Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti
when he was Deputy Attorney General. See TRIAL, Oct., 1978, at 41.
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criminals and what are white-collar crimes. Neither task is simple. Ed-
win H. Sutherland, the originator of the term, thought of white-collar
crime as a "crime committed by a person of respectability and high
social status in the course of his occupation."5 Another commentator
stressed the need to broaden the class while still focusing on the
status of the offender more than the nature of the offense, defining
white-collar crime as referring "to a broad sweep of offenses commit-
ted by those who have had all the advantages that society can offer, in-
cluding a good education, a good home, and the remarkable oppor-
tunities of the land. It includes securities fraud, embezzlement, bribes
and kickbacks, criminal tax evasion, and a wide range of business
crimes."6 Yet another commentator seems willing to deviate from
social status to the actor's relationship with the victim, proclaiming
that white-collar crime "is a breach of a fiduciary duty sufficient to
warrant the intervention of society."7 None of those attempts entirely
fill the bill if the term is to prove helpful to the sentencing process
5. E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 236 (1949). For the origin of the term
"white collar crime," see Sutherland, White Collar Criminality, 5 AM. Soc. REV. 1 (1940).
6. Seymour, Social and Ethical Considerations in Assessing White-Collar Crime, 11
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 821, 823 (1973).
7. Introduction: A Symposium, White-Collar Crime, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 817, 819
(1973).
8. The difficulty in defining white-collar crime is reflected by the fact that none of
the current rash of adopted and proposed sentencing guidelines specifically deal with the
white-collar offender on the offense/offender scoring grids. Some guidelines do, however,
permit the commission of economic offenses to be considered as an aggravating factor by
the sentencing judge. One such provision is contained in the recently promulgated Minne-
sota sentencing guidelines which list as an aggravating factor the commission of a major
economic offense. The specific provision in the Minnesota guidelines reads as follows:
The offense was a major economic offense, identified as an illegal act or series of il-
legal acts committed by other than physical means and by concealment or guile to
obtain money or property, to avoid payment or loss of money or property, or to ob-
tain business or professional advantage. The presence of two or more of the cir-
cumstances listed below are aggravating factors with respect to the offense:
(a) the offense involved multiple victims or multiple incidents per victim;
(b) the offense involved an attempted or actual monetary loss substantially
greater than the usual offense or substantially greater than the minimum loss
specified in the statutes;
(c) the offense involved a high degree of sophistication or planning or occurred
over a lengthy period of time;
(d) the defendant used his or her position or status to facilitate the commission of
the offense, including positions of trust, confidence, or fiduciary relationships;
or
(e) the defendant has been involved in other conduct similar to the current offense
as evidenced by the findings of civil or administrative law proceedings or the
imposition of professional sanctions.
The Philadelphia guidelines project, apparently stung by criticism that it favors the well
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To focus only on the status of the person committing the transgres-
sion is patently invalid. One need not wear expensive clothes or be
socially prominent to commit crimes which do not fit neatly into those
categories traditionally occupied by street criminals. Unscrupulous
owners of small automobile and television repair shops, who have
wrongly dipped as deeply into the pockets of consumers as have the
most prominent of offenders, deserve to be punished for such trans-
gressions. Yet, the type of economic harm they inflict clearly sets them
apart from the popular conception of street criminals and compels us
to consider them separately when determining the sanction to be im-
posed. And, even during the course of their business and professional
pursuits, the socially prominent may engage in activities that reek
more of violence than of sharp business practices. Consider, for exam-
ple, those misguided psychiatrists who, under the guise of therapy,
have committed what can most plausibly be described as rape upon
their hapless patients. Are such transgressors street criminals or
white-collar criminals?9
Similarly, the nature of the crime alone is not a sure clue as to how
a criminal should be classified. There is little functional difference be-
tween a thief who steals a social security check from a mailbox and
cashes it, thereby causing an elderly person to go without food, heat or
shelter, and an economic criminal whose unscrupulous and illegal acts
result in the same consequence. And, if one who kills or maims the pro-
prietor of a small grocery to facilitate a robbery of the daily receipts is
to be labeled a thug, is it rational to treat as somehow less culpable or
more respectable one who consciously places a dangerous product into
educated and employed defendant, has been working on the creation of a separate sen-
tencing grid for white-collar defendants. The definition tentatively adopted by that pro-
ject is
a crime committed by non-physical means to avoid payment of loss of money or
property, or to obtain business or personal advantage, or to obtain private gain for
the actor or another, or which endangers the public health, where such crime in-
volves a breach of private or public trust, public duty or the abuse of economic or
political power held by the person committing the act.
The definition currently used by the Economic Crime Unit of the Philadelphia District At-
torney's Office is "an illegal act or series of illegal acts committed by non-physical means
and by concealment or guile, to obtain money or property, to avoid the payment or loss of
money or property, or to obtain business or personal advantage."
9. The extent of the confusion that can be spawned by attempting to clearly
separate white-collar and street crime is reflected by a recent feature article in The Pitts-
burgh Press, headlined "Hottest White-Collar Crime: Arson for Profit." See Pittsburgh
Press, July 13, 1980, § B, at 1, cols. 1-6. It would be difficult to fit arson within the scope
of most current definitions of white-collar crimes. Yet, when arson is committed to
defraud an insurance company, it is clearly different from street crime and, as the cited
article states, it may indeed be "monopolized by the white-collar class."
Vol. 18:823
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the stream of commerce because it is more profitable to pay damage
claims to those whom he knows will be killed or maimed than to jet-
tison the project?
The above illustrations suffice to show that much so-called
"economic crime" is not sufficiently sanitized to distinguish it from
street crime, which also is often, if not usually, economically.motivated,
and that it can impact directly and sometimes violently on victims,
whether they be specifically ascertainable persons or anonymous mem-
bers of a statistical probability grouping. Other white-collar crimes are
more nearly victimless-not because they will in fact cause no harm to
specific persons, but because that harm will be so dispersed that it is
difficult to ascertain the precise impact upon each affected group
member. Income tax fraud and embezzlement from large banks are ex-
amples. As citizens and consumers, we all will ultimately be required
to pay more to offset the loss, and as a result will find our standards of
living that much lower than they might otherwise have been-just as
would be the case if we had been robbed of such sums at gun point.
Yet, notwithstanding more similarities than we might like to admit,
street crimes and criminals are different than a host of offenses and of-
fenders we have come to label "white-collar," or economic, offenses and
criminals. While street crime may be economically motivated, white-
collar crime is almost always so motivated. And, even economically
motivated street crime frequently results in physical harm to the vic-
tim because it is committed in situations where direct confrontation
with victims is a real, and not a remote possibility; and it is frequently
committed by persons whose own fears or repressed hatreds make
that confrontation particularly perilous. Judge David Bazelon, whose
first-hand experiences, personal sensitivity and outstanding abilities
place him in the first rank of amateur sociologists, has recognized this
difference, describing the world of violent street crime as
one of savage deprivation. Virtually all street crime comes out of wretched
poverty, broken families, malnutrition, mental and physical illness, mental
retardation, racial discrimination, and lack of opportunity. Street crime
springs from the anger and resentment of those who have been twisted
by a culture of grinding oppression. The roots of street crime are thus
embedded deep within the inequities of our very social structure. So long
as these inequities remain, the roots will be continually refreshed and re-
juvenated. To speak of incapacitation and deterrence in this context is to
consign oneself to a treadmill, unable to stem the increasing crime rates
despite a succession of repressive measures. 0
While white-collar criminals too can be forged in the same cauldrons,
10. Bazelon, Missed Opportunities in Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 57, 59
(1978).
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they usually are products of better environments and, even if not,
their defects are usually traceable to other causes; and although the
threat to society they pose may be just as great, or even greater, than
that of the street criminal, the infliction of physical harm is not a
direct cause of the act even though it may be a most foreseeable conse-
quence. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, it is highly likely
that those who may be lumped under the admittedly unsatisfactory
and nebulous rubric of "white-collar criminal" can be deterred from
pursuing their criminal proclivities by the implementation of mean-
ingful nonimprisonment sanctions that would have little or no effect on
preventing the commission of most violent street crimes."
Perhaps, then, white-collar crime has not been more clearly defined
because it is an indefinable blend of offense and offender char-
acteristics which, at least at the peripheries, shades imperceptibly into
some types of street crime. Yet, the term has been accepted because,
at least for purposes of imposing criminal sanctions, it serves a most
useful function." That we have been unable to define white-collar crime
more precisely has not prevented the courts from recognizing its ex-
.istence, nor has it prevented an ever growing segment of the public
and the law enforcement community from becrying the fact that it has
long been treated as somehow less odious than street crime. In short,
while the theorists haggle over terminology, the practitioners usually
know white-collar crime when they see it. 3 Where the uncertainity
arises is in fashioning an appropriate sanction.
11. Some believe that white-collar criminals should be identified so they can be
treated more harshly than street criminals, since they have had many of the advantages
this society has to offer yet have violated the system that has treated them relatively
well. Others isolate white-collar criminals, believing that they should be treated more
leniently than street criminals, since they pose a lesser threat to the physical well-being
of other members of society. I cannot accept either premise. If it is yet necessary to iden-
tify white-collar criminals, and I believe it is, it is because they-and many others who
run afoul of the justice system-can most probably be deterred from criminal activity by
implementation of a broad array of nonimprisonment sanctions. Thus, the legitimate
societal goal of cutting down the incidences of certain types of crime can be effectively
achieved without the economic and human losses occasioned by the unnecessary imprison-
ment of convicted persons. Subsequent portions of this article deal with the need to iden-
tify those criminals who can be punished effectively without incarceration, and with
developing alternatives to incarceration that will effectuate the desired amount of deter-
rence.
12. See note 11 supra.
13. Perhaps, then, white-collar crime is somewhat akin to hard-core pornography,
which Mr. Justice Stewart doubted he could ever intelligently define, but nonetheless had
no hesitation in observing: "I know it when I see it." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197
(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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II. IMPRISONMENT AS A SANCTION
The most frequently heard indictment of the handling of white-collar
criminals is that they are not often enough incarcerated and, when
sentenced to imprisonment, the terms are far too short. In order to
determine whether that indictment is warranted, it is necessary to ex-
amine the purposes of the imprisonment sanction and the impact its
use will have upon white-collar crime.
Generally, imprisonment has been justified by one or a combination
of the following purposes: deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation
and retribution." Each of those purposes, if fulfilled, will result in a
benefit to the community. Imprisonment, however, is not cost free. In-
itially, it takes great sums of money to construct and maintain prison
facilities. 5 Then, it is expensive to keep prisoners incarcerated16 and,
while they are incarcerated, they are for the most part economically un-
14. See generally A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976)
(Report of the Committee for the Study of Incarceration) [hereinafter cited as VON
HIRSCH].
15. See N. SINGER & V. WRIGHT, COST ANALYSIS OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS:
INSTITUTIONAL-BASED PROGRAMS AND PAROLE 17-18 (1976). This study indicates that the
then per-prisoner cost of constructing jails was as high as $57,000 per prisoner space. See
also Orland, From Vengeance to Vengeance: Sentencing Reform and the Demise of
Rehabilitation, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 29, 51 (1978) (stating that the then current cost for the
construction of a new prison bed in Connecticut was approximately $50,000) [hereinafter
cited as Orland]. A recent magazine article noted that it would cost five billion dollars to
construct the eight hundred local, state, and federal facilities planned for construction as
of January, 1977, to house an additional 200,000 prison beds. THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY,
March 19, 1980, at 323.
16. Professor Orland stated that the annual maintenance cost for a Connecticut
prisoner was $9,000. See Orland, supra note 13, at 51. A study of the per-prisoner
maintenance costs in the City of New York for the year ending June 30, 1976 disclosed
that in some institutions the cost exceeded $26,000. See COOPERS & LYBRAND, THE COST OF
INCARCERATION IN NEW YORK CITY 5 (1978). Since there is an historical tendency to fill
available prison space, the prisoner-maintenance costs per useful life of each newly con-
structed prison bed could, even at present costs, easily exceed $1,000,000. See W. NAGEL,
PRISONIA: AMERICA'S GROWING MEGALOPOLIS 3 (1979), (presented at Seminar for
Legislators on Alternatives to New Prison Construction at the Brookings Institution).
There, the President of the American Foundation Inc., Institute of Corrections, noted that
an informal study disclosed that the fifteen states which had done the most prison con-
struction during the past twenty years had the highest percentage increases in prison
population, and that a more formal study conducted for the Congress in 1979 by Apt
Associates of Boston concluded that:
[Tihe most important single contributor to prison population was not crime, or
unemployment, or family breakdown, or race, or inflation. It was simply the
availability of cells. Judges, prosecutors, police, parole boards all adjust their prac-
tices to the availability of prison space. It seems that we Americans would find
tens-even hundreds-of thousands of other Americans to lock up if we only had
the cells.
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productive members of society, directly and indirectly draining assets
and returning nothing.'7 Moreover, we can no longer ignore the fact
that whatever benefits imprisonment provides to the free members of
society are often won at the expense of exposing the incarcerated to
extreme degradation and abuse. 8 Such treatment often results in yet
another cost-returning to society a person who has been so warped
17. There have been moves to provide prisoners with productive employment oppor-
tunities that would enable them to pay the costs of their own incarceration. See, e.g., van
den Haag, Punitive Sentences, 7 HOFSTRA, L. REV. 123 (1978) [hereinafter cited as van den
Haag]. Professor van den Haag states that:
Prisoners are not given productive work and they are not allowed to earn
enough to pay for their keep. Most legal experts are in favor, as I am, of normal
wages and work opportunities for prisoners, and of incentive pay. Even non-
monetary work incentives, such as shortening of sentences according to work per-
formed are not altogether inconsistent with deterrent punishment, if kept within
narrow limits .... [P]risons are costly only because we insist on making them costly.
They could be self-supporting and, if prisoners become taxpayers, they could in-
crease government revenue.
Id. at 137. While it is difficult to mount arguments against such a theory, it is probable
that implementation cannot readily be achieved. Professor van den Haag notes that
obstacles "come from labor unions and business." Id. And, it is probable that the private
sector is far better equipped to run profitable businesses than government bureaucracies,
and that inefficiently run governmental attempts to enter the business field might well
result in losses that are even greater than the present costs of incarceration. Moreover,
the prisoners whose skills and drives are likely to make them the best candidates for fill-
ing such prison jobs are also likely to be the best candidates for nonimprisonment alter-
native sanctions. Use of alternative sanctions could permit these persons to be even more
productive while being meaningfully punished, thus achieving that effect without the
damaging collateral consequences of even the best run prison operation. While im-
prisoned-even if employed in a prison job-the prisoner's dependents are likely to suffer
adverse social and economic consequences, especially if the convicted felon was formerly a
person of some means; during incarceration, the defendant is likely to be degraded as a
human being, thereby returning a psychologically damaged person to society; and, after
release, the felon will have to attempt to start from scratch in finding new employment
and in otherwise rejoining the environment from which he was involuntarily removed.
Many prisoners can indeed be permitted to become or remain economically productive
by simply using forms of punishment that, although meaningful and real, are not life-
disruptive. In this manner the convicted criminal can be a productive, taxpaying member
of society while being punished. The hypothesis Professor van den Haag poses should be
reserved only for those criminals who cannot be dealt with in a meaningful alternative
manner. And, as to most of them, it is likely to be found that no rehabilitative effort will
be overly effective.
18. The nationwide rash of actions brought by prisoners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976), alleging violations of constitutional rights, clearly divulges that prison conditions
throughout the United States leave much to be desired. And, even a casual perusal of
newspapers and magazines forcefully drives home the fact that all is not well within
prison walls. For example, one trial judge, imposing sentence on a prisoner convicted of
raping another inmate, said: "I have never been impressed with the claim that these sex-
ual attacks go on in every institution and there is nothing you can do about them. . ..
From the testimony I have heard there must be these sexual vultures in every corner of
830 Vol. 18:823
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or untracked by the prison experience that he finds it difficult to "fit
in" or to pick up the pieces of a shattered and disrupted career, and is
thus far more likely to again turn to a life of crime, or, at the very
least, never realize his maximum socially beneficial capacities.19 If any
criminals, including white-collar criminals, are to be imprisoned, it
must be shown that imprisonment serves a legitimate purpose and
that the benefits society will gain outweigh the costs it will inflict. An
examination of each of the justifications for imprisonment strongly in-
dicates that neither contingency occurs with the imprisonment of most
"white-collar" criminals.
A. Deterrence
It is probable that the threat of imprisonment does deter the com-
mission of some types of crimes. 0 And, even though there is little em-
the jail and apparently little is done to stop it [homosexual rapes]." Pittsburgh Post
Gazette, June 3, 1980, at 20, col. 1.
Following are excerpts from a letter recently received by a jurist from a former in-
mate of the same jail described by the trial judge quoted above:
I have personally observed numerous beatings, thefts, protective payments ex-
torted from prisoners in fear of their lives. Gangs of roving prisoners preyed upon
young, weak and often first offenders. Commissary sales were operated by inmates.
The money booklets were often stolen, lost or conveniently misplaced. I saw a men-
tal patient take a self-lock up on 12-range. He was severly beaten, kicked, punched
and violently assaulted. He finally agreed to pay $10 a week protection, and was
free to come and go unharmed. Next came the rapes. A roving band, free to play,
day or night. Danny, a young boy, quiet, shy and frail. They took turns, four of
them, two to hold his arms and legs apart one to stand guard, and one to fuck his
ass, over and over again. He was sent to the select housing unit. That man couldn't
eat, talk or walk for days. He never blinked his eyes nor showed any expression. I
had three young offenders run into my cell. All were crying, terrified and pleading
for help. In came three men ... At 7:30 the next morning, they were back again....
Inmates run sign in books and cell assignments. Night crew workers are free to
roam at random. They "check out" the "new faces" and often force them to perform
oral sex thru the cell bars . . . There is no segregation of juvenile, military
A.W.O.L.S. or mentally disturbed patients. They are usually placed on a special
range called Bum Range. There, a 33 year old was beaten and repeatedly raped. A
guard walked upon this rape accidentally and was told to leave or get hurt. He did.
19. For a study illustrating many of the economic realities leading to a life of crime
as well as the economic problems encountered upon release from prison, see U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, UNLOCKING THE SECOND GATE (1977).
20. There are two types of deterrence. The first, referred to as "special deterrence,"
deals with deterring a specific individual from recidivating by punishing him for a par-
ticular transgression. What empirical evidence there is tends to establish that this type of
deterrence is not affected by incarceration. See Nagin, General Deterrence: A Review of
the Empirical Evidence, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES (1978) [hereinafter cited as Nagin]. The author of
this study posits that:
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pirical confirmation, it is also probable that white-collar criminals are
among the most sensitive to the threat of the imprisonment sanction
and among those most able to rationally conclude that the threatened
loss makes the unlawful benefit unworthy of the risk.2 ' To so conclude,
however, is not necessarily to condone the use of imprisonment as the
primary sanction for the commission of white-collar crimes. It must
On balance, recent evidence tends to suggest that special deterrence which obser-
vationally is difficult to distinguish from other forms of "rehabilitation," is not
operating. This tentative conclusion is suggested by the apparent invariance of
recidivism to any type of special rehabilitative program. . . .The figures suggest
that recidivism rates cannot be affected by varying the severity of punishment, at
least within acceptable limits.
Id. at 95-96. He adds, however, that the evidence "is still only preliminary." Id. at 96.
The second type of deterrence, called general deterrence, is the effect use of sanctions
has on other potential criminals. See Tullock, Does Punishment Deter Crime?, 36 PUBLIC
INTEREST 103 (1974) (concludes that incarceration does serve a general deterrent effect).
See also van den Haag, note 15 supra; Forst, Rhodes & Wellford, Sentencing and Social
Science: Research for the Formulation of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 7 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 355, 362-364 (1979). However, a thoroughly detailed study concludes that "despite the
intensity of the research effort, the empirical evidence is still not sufficient for providing
a rigorous confirmation of the existence of a [general] deterrent effect. Perhaps more im-
portant, the evidence is woefully inadequate for providing a good estimate of the
magnitude of whatever effect may exist." Nagin, supra at 135.
Professor von Hirsch, although recognizing the empirical evidence to be sketchy,
believes that some types of offenses may be deterrence-sensitive, and concludes that "a
penalty still may deter better than none." VON HIRSCH, supra note 14, at 41. Professor von
Hirsch points out that general deterrence is usually difficult to measure since there is a
reluctance to eliminate the penalty to ascertain if the incidence of crimes increases; and
since increasing an already existing meaningful penalty does not normally have a
dramatic impact on decreasing its incidences. Id. at 37-44. There is some evidence,
however, that making criminal an act which was formerly not deemed criminal-such as
Britain did in 1967 by making it a crime to drive with more than a stated amount of
alcohol in the blood-does reduce the consequences criminalization was intended to con-
trol. Thus, there was a sharp decrease in night-time traffic fatalities immediately follow-
ing the British criminalization of driving under the influence.
It is significant that the punishment of many white-collar and public trust criminals is
done largely to effectuate a retributive purpose or a general deterrent effect, since their
indictments and/or conviction make it unlikely they will be given the opportunity to again
commit similar crimes. Thus, if the public censure and removal from positions of power
and influence has a general deterrent effect among that category of people in a position to
commit such crimes, general deterrence may not compel a greater sanction. Some further
"punishment" may, however, be justified as filling a special deterrence function so that
the defendant is not encouraged to engage in illegal activities still available to him, and so
that the public perceives he is in fact not being favored because of his status. This "public
perception" justification may be a broader form of general deterrence than described by
Professor Nagin.
21. See Bazelon, supra note 10, at 59 ("while the concept of deterrence may have ap-
plication in the area of white collar crime, it has little or no meaning in the alienated world
of violent street crime"). See also Geis & Edelhertz, Criminal Law and Consumer Fraud.
A Sociolegal View, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 989, 1005 (1973).
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first be determined whether the costs of imprisonment are worth the
deterrent benefits that are derived; and whether there are available
other meaningful sanctions which provide the same general and special
deterrent effects without such severe societal losses.
To derive the full deterrent benefits of imprisonment, there must be
a willingness to increase prison terms to extraordinarily high levels;22
and, perhaps, a willingness to routinely incarcerate white-collar
criminals in institutions housing street criminals, knowing full well
that this will subject them to physical abuses and degradation that are
most probably feared as much as or even more than the possibility of
incarceration itself.' Thus, if deterrence is thought a sufficient reason
to warrant imprisonment, it must further be decided just how much
deterrence we desire and the price we are willing to pay for that
amount of deterrence. ' It must be emphasized here that deterrence is
22. It is probable that some nonviolent crimes could be almost completely eliminated
if the punishments were made sufficiently severe. Thus, by way of illustration, if speeding
on the interstate highways carried a mandatory twenty-year prison sentence, it is unlikely
there would be many speeding offenses and probable that, within a short time, all cars
would be equipped with governors prohibiting the exceeding of the proscribed speeds. It
is unlikely, however, that the public would tolerate so harsh a penalty for what is perceived
as being a minor offense. Similarly, many types of business crime could likely be
eradicated if those responsible received long, and mandatory, prison sentences. It is ques-
tionable, however, whether the short-term punitive impact on the convicted persons
would warrant so drastic a "cure." And, in any event, the legitimate societal goal of deter-
rence cannot be permitted to override an individual's right not to be excessively punished
for a transgression. Such a practice would make the government more culpable than the
accused, and cannot be condoned in a democratic society.
It is not so clear that increasing the already stringent penalties for more serious
crimes of violence and passion would have the same deterrent effect, and the probability
is that any decrease in the commission of such "unthinking" crimes that would occur as a
result of increasing the punishment would be less than dramatic.
23. See note 18 supra. For another indictment of imprisonment, see Harris & Dun-
baugh, Premise For a Sensible Sentencing Debate: Giving Up Imprisonment, 7 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 417 (1979). See also M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, LAW WITHOUT ORDER
(1973).
24. While deterrence is undoubtedly a legitimate function of the justice system, it
cannot justify any more imprisonment than is warranted by the offense. See VON HIRSCH,
supra note 14, at 61-65. While it is believed that we humans are incapable of determining
what is in fact a "just" sentence for a particular offense and a particular offender, it is
probable that we can sense when a punishment is so great as to be manifestly unfair and,
as a consequence, reject it out of hand even though it can be statistically shown to serve a
deterrent function. Thus, deterrence- which is a legitimate function of a justice system-
must of necessity be limited at the upper end by basic concepts of individual freedom and
dignity. But see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976), where Justice Stewart implied
that retribution can justify capital punishment. If that is so, it is not inconceivable that a
future Supreme Court might hold that general deterrence justifies a punishment more
harsh than the offense itself might otherwise warrant. For judicial authority that retribu-
tion is not a valid basis for sentencing a defendant in Pennsylvania, see Commonwealth v.
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solely for the benefit of society, and that concept cannot justify harm-
ing the criminal if the harm does not result in a benefit to society.25
The free members of our society must, therefore, determine exactly
how much deterrence we desire, and that determination will obviously
be tempered by the costs, both to society and to the criminal, of the
sanction that will provide the deterrence.
The longer the sentence and the more harsh the prison environment
the greater the deterrent effect will likely be. Since white-collar
crimes by definition are not likely to be crimes of passion, it is prob-
able that sufficient increases in the sentence and routine use of hard-
core prison facilities will entirely wipe out some, if not all, types of
white-collar crimes." This obviously beneficial end, however, would be
won at a price it is doubtful we are willing to pay. It is probable,
therefore, that any imprisonment sanction we ultimately choose will be
one that is not likely to eliminate white-collar crime entirely but, in-
stead, will evidence a willingness to tolerate some such crime simply
because the societal and individual costs of complete deterrence are
likely to be greater than the perceived worth of the benefits received.'
Thus, acceptable levels of imprisonment as a deterrence factor are not
Kostka, No. 48 March Term, 1978 (Pa. Super. Ct. March 28, 1980). That decision was premised
not on any constitutional prohibition, but rather on principles of statutory construction.
25. As illustrated in the preceeding note, even socially beneficial deterrence should
not be permitted to override the interests of the affected individual in receiving no
greater sanction than could conceivably be warranted by the nature of the offense com-
mitted, with all errors as to what that punishment could permissibly be decided in the in-
dividual's favor. Thus, there must be a "lid" on deterrence as a punishment basis. If in-
carceration provides no societal benefits other than those which could be obtained with
nonimprisonment sanctions, incarceration is patently indefensible even though the involved
individual may find it more onerous than a nonimprisonment alternative sanction which
achieves the same deterrent effect.
26. See note 22 supra.
27. Our past reluctance to imprison convicted white-collar criminals is somewhat il-
lustrative of this unwillingness.. Complete deterrence, which is likely to result in the
short-term imposition of exceedingly long prison sentences for crimes that do not warrant
such treatment, involves high direct costs in constructing and maintaining prisons and in
keeping economically productive human resources inactive and useless for long periods of
time; plus large indirect costs of maintaining the dependents of the incarcerated in-
dividual and making it more difficult for him to become a productive member of society
upon his ultimate release. In addition, should the public perceive that unjust punishments
that do not fit the crime are being meted out by government, a great deal of governmen-
tal respect is destroyed. Moreover, it is probable that large numbers of those with
criminal inclinations who are deterred by the imposition of unduly harsh punishments will
turn their efforts to other areas - illegal, but not as severely punished, or "barely legal"
because the legislatures have not yet recognized such activities as criminal-and simply
shift the areas in which their activities cause widespread public loss. In short, it is dif-
ficult, and probably most ineffective, to use criminal sanctions to upgrade moral behavior.
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likely to ever achieve the ultimate goal of preventing white-collar
crime because it is probable that we, as a humane people, will be un-
willing to pay or impose the extreme costs prevention will require.
What we seek, then, is enough punishment to deter at least some who
might otherwise engage in criminal activity, even though the level of
punishment chosen will not completely rid us of the economic criminal.
Once we are willing to admit that complete deterrence cannot be
our goal, we are well on the road to rejecting imprisonment as the ap-
propriate sanction for large numbers of offenders and offenses. That
statement can be safely made because it is probable that imaginative
and consistent use of nonincarceration sanctions can provide us with
just as much deterrence as will the amount of imprisonment this soci-
ety is willing to impose, and that it will achieve that degree of deter-
rence without many of the direct and indirect costs of imprisonment. If
that is so, deterrence simply cannot justify the use of imprisonment as
a sanction for white-collar crime because there are less costly methods
of achieving the same degree of deterrence.28 And, since deterrence is
a societal benefit and not at all related to the need to punish the indi-
vidual wrongdoer, it is imperative that the benefit be achieved at the
lowest cost to society and without the infliction of any unnecessary in-
jury or suffering upon the individual criminal.
While even die-hard adherents of deterrence as the primary
justification for imprisonment might theoretically agree with the above
statements, they will undoubtedly challenge the use of the alternative
sanctions on the ground that we do not know the deterrent effect that
each such alternative might provide, while we can more accurately
assess the deterrent effect of imprisonment.' We do know, for exam-
ple, the sentences that are currently being levied upon white-collar
criminals and we can somewhat accurately assess the incidences of
such crimes. Thus, we can roughly predict that codifying the present
practices will result in maintaining a status quo, and that increasing
the use of the imprisonment sanction will lower the incidence of white-
collar crimes, although it is not certain how much lower the score will
28. The phrase "less costly" is used in the sense that the alternative means have
fewer direct and indirect monetary costs, and that they are less damaging to the affected
individual and his dependents. These human costs, although difficult to translate into
economic terms, are as debilitating a consequence of imprisonment as are the "real"
economic costs.
29. But see note 20 supra, which strongly indicates that the empirical evidence
available as to the deterrent effects of incarceration is far from conclusive. It is probable
that the existing data pertaining to white-collar criminals is even less conclusive since so
few white-collar criminals have been ferreted out, prosecuted and imprisoned in the past.
See Seymour, Social and Ethical Considerations in Assessing White-Collar Crime, 11 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 821, 833-34 (1973).
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be.3" Conversely, shortening the imprisonment sanction is likely to
somewhat increase the incidence of such crime, again by an indefinable
extent. Thus, at least theoretically, those charged with designing
sentencing guidelines can, by codifying the present practices, work
from that basis in determining whether more or less deterrence is in
the best interest of society, and can even project the costs that will be
incurred or saved by deviating from that base. We cannot start from
so comfortable'a base if we use alternatives to incarceration because
there is simply no existing data upon which we can draw and thus we
will have to begin with assumptions unsupported by solid empirical
data.
We are not, however, forced to start completely in the dark. We do
know that any form of punishment will likely have some deterrent ef-
fect, even though we cannot be sure of the extent of that effect until
the nonincarceration punishment is put into actual use and measured
against the continued incidences of specific white-collar crimes. Thus,
while initially we will not be able to predict with any certainty
whether the nonimprisonment sanctions chosen will maintain the
status quo, cause an increase in the incidence of white-collar crimes, or
cause such crimes to decrease, within a relatively short time data
which could provide rather precise answers to that question will
become available. Moreover, use of the nonimprisonment sanction will
create a system in which prosecutors are not tempted to accept pleas
to reduced charges and where judges can more securely impose mean-
ingful sanctions on a broader range of white-collar criminals because
they will know that imposition of such sanctions will not cause spouses
and children to suffer the economic consequences that imprisonment
indiscriminately imposes upon innocent and guilty alike. And, mean-
ingful nonimprisonment sanctions will not, as imprisonment has a
tendency to do, increase the likelihood that the white-collar criminal
will upon release resort to more vicious types of crime to support
himself because of the disruptive and dislocative effect of the imprison-
ment sanction. Thus, the adoption of nonincarceration sanctions is very
likely to have the desirable effect of increasing the likelihood that a
30. Even if there is a broad enough sampling to enable us to make useful predictions
as to the deterrent effect of incarcerating white-collar criminals, the statistics are sure to
be too sketchy and incomplete to enable us to predict the impact of a worsening economy
on the commission of such crimes. Thus, for practical purposes, the statistical information
we currently possess may be no more useful than the complete dearth of information as to
the deterrent effect of nonimprisonment alternative sanctions. By far the sounder ap-
proach would be to choose that method which theoretically make the most sense, and then
to begin collecting and collating more complete and "cleaner" statistics that could in the
future provide the basis for sound adjustments.
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meaningful sanction will be imposed upon one found guilty of white-
collar crime rather than a mere judicial slap on the wrist. In that man-
ner, consistent application of nonimprisonment sanctions may prove to
have even greater deterrent effects than the occasional imposition of
relatively stiff prison terms."' To the intelligent, nonvicious, calculating
white-collar criminal, the certainty of a meaningful nonimprisonment
sanction may prove far more threatening than the remote possibility of
a stiff prison sentence. Thus, unless we are ready to throw white-collar
criminals to the prison wolves in such numbers as to make jail a sure
risk for all economic transgressions -which I doubt very much to be
the case- nonimprisonment sanctions may well prove to be even more
of a deterrence to criminal activity than incarceration.
Nonimprisonment sanctions, just as imprisonment, can be adjusted
upward or downward to implement the desired deterrent effect. And,
it is probable that the very same degree of deterrence that can be
achieved by imposition of those prison sentences society is willing to
accept for economic transgressions can be achieved by consistent use
of alternative sanctions, without either the direct cost of feeding and
housing a nonproductive criminal in a corrective institution or the con-
siderable indirect costs to society that the imprisonment of an eco-
nomically useful person entails. If that is so, deterrence simply cannot
justify incarceration of the white-collar prisoner, or of any other
prisoner who is sensitive to nonimprisonment sanctions.
31. It is probable that the certainty of a meaningful sanction if caught, even though
that meaningful sanction is something other than imprisonment, will have a more deter-
rent effect than the remote spectre of incarceration. White-collar criminals, being
somewhat sophisticated almost by definition are likely aware of the fact that few even
very violent first offenders are given prison sentences and are thus likely to regard the
threat of probation or a flat-rate fine as a risk worth taking. They might not be so em-
boldened if, from the first offense on, a meaningful, punitive sanction would almost cer-
tainly be levied, and this is a more likely contingency if the sanction will not result in the
total disruption and degradation of the individual that is the usual result of imprisonment.
As one commentator has stated:
The threat of incarceration is the major deterrent of the criminal sanction. In
business crime cases, however, prevailing sentencing practices make the only cer-
tain sanctions upon conviction a suspended sentence or a very short prison term.
While for some white-collar offenders who occupy positions of social, economic or
professional status, mere indictment or conviction can have enormous consequences
and may themselves be credible and effective threat, the elimination of the serious
possibility of jail from the calculus of potential offenders, by any rational standard,
diminishes the seriousness of the threat.
Ogren, supra note 1, at 961-62. The patent difficulty with this conclusion is that it fails to
recognize the existence of meaningful nonimprisonment sanctions that, if consistently
employed, would deter many potential white-collar criminals.
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B. Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation offers the least justification for the imprisonment of
white-collar criminals. Virtually all such criminals, by definition, have
marketable skills and are capable of being productively and gainfully
employed. Indeed, many are already members of learned professions
and have been educated to a far greater degree than are those whose
task it may be to provide rehabilitation. Any rehabilitation that may
be required is more likely to be moral or ethical rather than voca-
tional, and prisons simply lack the facilites and the resources to ac-
complish such tasks. Moreover, even assuming moral and ethical
rehabilitation to be possible, its cost would undoubtedly be so pro-
hibitive as to make its availability exceedingly unlikely.
The problem is not to retool the white-collar criminal, but to induce
him to put his already acquired skills to legitimate uses. This is far
more likely to be accomplished by increasing efforts in detecting, pros-
ecuting and effectively punishing economic crimes than by providing
moral guidance to those who are convicted.
By no stretch of the imagination is rehabilitation, especially as prac-
ticed in correctional institutions geared primarily to deal with those
who are often incapable of performing any but the most menial tasks, a
legitimate basis upon which to justify the imprisonment of white-collar
criminals. This questionable justification for imprisonment of any of-
fenders is simply inapplicable to the white-collar criminal and is
deserving of no further comment here.2
C. Incapacitation
The desire to protect society by incapacitating those found guilty of
criminal activity has a long, if checkered, history. One who is impris-
oned for his transgression will not be able, during the course of that
imprisonment, to inflict harm upon the nonprison population and, in
that manner, a measure of protection is afforded the free public that
might not otherwise exist. However, the cost of such protection is
high.
Initially, the imprisoned transgressor is not completely isolated, but
is still permitted some contact with other members of the prison
population. And, if he is inclined to continue his lawless ways, there is
still the opportunity to inflict the consequences of that lawlessness
32. For general indictments of rehabilitation as a justification for imprisonment, see
VON HIRSCH, supra note 14, at 10-18. But see Orland, note 15 supra (illustrates that the
past ineffectiveness of rehabilitation is no justification for jumping aboard the retributive
bandwagon).
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upon this captive segment of society." Thus, it is not a complete in-
capacitation that is provided but only a narrowing of the field within
which future criminal activity can be practiced. Moreover, if incapacita-
tion is a justification for imprisonment, there is no way it can be
limited to those who will in fact inflict further harm upon society if
released, since we cannot predict with any great degree of certainty
which convicted persons will repent and which will continue on their
lawless ways.u Thus, to make incapacitation effective we will have to
imprison both those who will again transgress the law and those who,
if returned to a free society, would commit no further crimes. In
short, to effectuate an incapacitation policy we will have to strip away
the presumption of innocence as to future criminal activity and replace
it with a presumption that the transgressor will continue along his il-
licit path. That presumption of future culpability even before there is
an opportunity for future criminal activity is, to say the least,
troublesome and is in patent conflict with the presumption of in-
nocence that prevails at all other levels of the criminal law. And, it will
result in many cases of unnecessary imprisonment so that the free
33. See note 18 supra. Increased use of the imprisonment sanction to punish white-
collar criminals, who are most probably ill-equipped to cope with the street criminals
whom they will likely be thrown in contact with, will in all probability increase the crime
that already flourishes within prison walls. While this threat could be minimized by the
construction of new prisons designed only to house white-collar criminals, the high costs
of new prison construction and the public perception that such criminals are not being truly
punished will likely moot that contingency.
34. See Task Force on the Role of Psychology in the Criminal Justice System,
Report, 33 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1099 (1978):
It does appear from reading the research that the validity of psychological predic-
tions of violent behavior, at least in the sentencing and release situations we are
considering, is extremely poor, so poor that one could oppose their use on the
strictly empirical grounds that psychologists are not professionally competent to
make such judgments.
Id. at 1110. It is probable that determining when white-collar criminals will recidivate is
at least as difficult. See Underwood, Law and the Crystal Balk Predicting Behavior with
Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408 (1979).
35. See VON HIRSCH, supra note 14, at 19-26. The predictive capabilities as applied to
white-collar criminals are likely to be even less reliable than those applicable to violent
criminals, since so few such criminals have been prosecuted in the past and even fewer in-
carcerated. Thus, the available statistical samplings are small:
If the conduct to be predicted occurs rarely in the sample, the crudity of these in-
puts takes its toll. With a predictive instrument of so little discernment and a
target population so small, the forecaster will be able to spot a significant percent-
age of the actual violators only if a large number of false positives is also included.
The process resembles trying to hit a small bull's eye with a blunderbluss: to strike
the center of the target with any of the shot, the marksman will have to allow most
of his discharge to hit outside it.
Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
840 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 18:823
public is spared the impact of the would-be recidivists included in the
broad imprisoned grouping.
Where the danger sought to be prevented is immediate violent im-
pact upon the nonprison population-as is the case with the rapist,
murderer, etc.-the benefit sought may at least arguably merit the
high costs both to society and to the incarcerated individual predictive
imprisonment inflicts. It is doubtful, however, whether incapacitation
warrants the use of imprisonment for the economic criminal.
This conclusion is not made because it is believed that white-collar
criminals are any less likely to become recidivists than street crimi-
nals, or because it is believed that the impact of their criminal activi-
ties is any less damaging to their victims. It results instead from the
realization that the damaging impact of economic crimes is usually less
direct than that of the murderer or rapist, and from a belief that there
are effective nonimprisonment methods of incapacitating white-collar
criminals that do not presently exist for controlling violent crime.
There are, by way of illustration, no workable and acceptable nonim-
prisonment restraints to prevent one with a proclivity toward violent
assault from engaging in that crime. Once an individual is released, all
we can attempt to do is monitor his activities by having him report to
a probation officer and attempt to prevent his consorting with known
criminals or carrying a weapon. We cannot watch over him twenty-four
hours a day. A violent crime can be committed far too quickly and with
too little advance preparation to make this limited type of surveillance
at all effective. The economic criminal, however, cannot usually commit
crime quite so quickly and sporadically. He frequently must set the
stage for such activity-if he is an embezzler, for instance, he must ob-
tain a position of trust with a business or institution. If he is a home-
repair cheat, he must set up a business and advertise the availability
of his services. It is far easier to detect when the convicted economic
criminal is again in a position where he can follow whatever dishonest
proclivities he may have, and to monitor those activites more closely,
thus ensuring that the chances of his again engaging in economic crime
are limited. Moreover, it is probable that the areas of his future
criminal activity can be severely curtailed by making as part of the
sentence a requirement that he refrain from those types of business ac-
tivity that have in the past spawned his illicit behavior-such as the
condition attached to the release from imprisonment of Jimmy Hoffa."
36. Just as Hoffa was prevented from mismanagement of union funds by being
precluded from engaging in union activities, it is possible to impose as a condition of
sentence similar restrictions on those white-collar and political criminals who have used
their positions of influence and trust to illicitly further their own means. Such relatively
easily monitored restrictions seem far preferable to incarceration, and are just as likely to
eliminate the perceived risk.
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If a person is to be punished, it should be for what he has done and
not for what he may do in the future. If it is ever proper to deviate
from that standard, it is probable that the justification exists only to
prevent the almost certain risk of severe physical harm which can in
no other way be obviated. This type of gross "prior restraint" should
not be based upon the threat of an indirect injury which can in many
instances be minimized by effective controls that do not completely
curtail the convicted felon's freedom.
D. Retribution
The fourth justification for imprisonment is that one who trans-
gresses the law should be punished for his action. It is difficult to
think of retribution as a wholly separate justification for imprisoning
criminals, because incarceration for the purpose of punishment also
results in incapacitating the convicted person and as a deterrence to
others who might also be inclined to transgress the law. If it is decided
that incapacitation and deterrence are not in and of themselves suffi-
cient bases to justify incarceration of a particular individual, however,
it must further be resolved whether retribution provides such justifica-
tion. For, it seems reasonable to conclude that factors which in and of
themselves do not justify imprisonment are not likely to provide such
justification simply when added to other factors also lacking justifica-
tion.
Initially, I am fully in agreement that one convicted of transgressing
the law should be punished. 7 Moreover, I strongly believe that the
punishment should be meaningful and that it should transcend a mere
judicial warning or use of a probation system so overworked that the
sanctions it can reasonably impose are only theoretically observed. One
who commits a crime and as a practical matter receives no sanction is
likely to be encouraged to commit yet another transgression; and, most
certainly, the public will perceive that crime does indeed pay. No
system can long endure such practices.
To say that I believe in punishment, and that the punishment should
indeed be meaningful and onerous, however, is not at all the same as
saying that the punishment must in all instances be incarceration.
There are undoubtedly persons who must be imprisoned simply
because they are insensitive to other types of punishment or pose a
real danger to the safety of other members of society. Obviously, a fine
37. I do not believe, however, that the punishment can ever legitimately exceed that
which is necessary to provide either special or general deterrence; and, even if harsher
punishment would serve an undoubted deterrent function, I do not believe it can be so
harsh as to be disproportionate to the offense. Thus, deterrence is not an open-ended
justification for punishment, but must be limited by individual concerns and rights.
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is an ineffective remedy against one without the ability to pay it; and
no system can long endure if it takes two probation officers to make
sure that a convicted felon reports to a detention or work center every
evening to serve a sentence depriving him of his leisure time. That
alternative punishments will not work in all instances, however, does
not obviate the fact that for many convicted felons they represent real
and substantial punishments and serve a valid retributive and deter-
rent function.
Much is made of the fact that punishments must be equal-that it is
somehow unfair to sentence one person who commits a crime to a term
of imprisonment and another to an alternative nonimprisonment sanc-
tion. However, punishment can never be equal. To some, a year in jail
is no big deal. To others, it is a horrendous punishment that may drive
the recipient to or over the suicidal brink. To say that sentencing each
of those very different felons to one year in prison is to punish them
equally ignores reality. Equal sentences have nothing to do with equal
punishment and everything to do with providing only the outward ap-
pearance of equal punishment. Punishment is a subjective thing, and
the extent of the punishment differs with regard to the sensitivity to a
particular punishment of the person we seek to punish. Thus, even
assuming that it is possible precisely to quantify various criminal acts
to assess their wrongful worth, we are not ever likely to be able to
punish the like crimes identically, because the person punished will in
each instance differ. We can strive, then, for a system that seeks only
to provide the outward appearance of equal punishment, even though
it will compel us to assess far more punishment to some than to others
found to have violated the same or similar laws; or we can seek to in-
dividualize punishment, by assessing each convicted person's tolerance
to punishment, and adjusting the sentence upward or downward to ac-
commodate that tolerance. The first solution is easily workable, but
totally at odds with either a true retributive model or with a just
deserts model, because the actual punishment inflicted will bear no
relationship to the degree of punishment that is believed deserved. 8
38. Unfortunately, most sentencing guidelines that have been adopted or proposed
opt for this easily workable solution. Even more unfortunately, attempts to use social
stability factors as mitigating criteria-which might at least partially achieve a most
desirable "individualization" for sentencing purposes-have been attacked as impacting
most severely upon those unfortunate members of society who are poor, ill-educated, and
unemployed or unemployable. On that ground, they have been-I believe un-
fairly -condemned as racially biased, since large numbers of convicted persons who would
not benefit by the proposed mitigating factors are members of racial minorities. Thus,
while such factors are most probably helpful in determining which convicted persons are
plausible candidates for nonimprisonment alternative sanctions, it is likely that political
pressures will prevent their incorporation in many sentencing guidelines presently being
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The second solution pays respect to the retributive purpose, but is dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to administer because we have no valid way of
measuring an individual's punishment threshold.
Retribution is a tricky business, best left to the Almighty who does
not function with our limited capabilities. As children we are ad-
monished against the propriety of playing God. Apparently, the
retributionists have forgotten those lessons.
I am uncomfortable in ridiculing the retributionists because I
believe most crime is wrong, and that wrongdoers should be punished.
But, I am aware that the punishment must be assessed by mortals who
are by nature of that fact incapable of determining what are just
punishments for such transgressions. Perhaps theologians could arrive
at just sanctions for illicit acts, but I cannot. And, I am firmly convinced
that "just punishment" is not something that can be fitted upon each
convicted criminal as is a rack suit-we differ more internally and
emotionally than physiologically, and what will be a severe punishment
for one is likely to be relatively meaningless to another. Even if we
could internalize and individualize punishment, I would be uncomfort-
able in attempting to provide a moral grid for white-collar criminals-
deciding, for example, that an embezzler is morally bound to serve five
years and a bad check artist only two. By what justification? By whose
fiat? By virture of what moral insight are we to arrive at the ap-
propriate punishment; whose perspective of a crime's seriousness
should we incorporate?
We, as mortals, can determine what acts we believe detrimental in a
free society and attempt to reduce the incidents of such acts. More-
over, we can take those steps likely to deter such acts, including the
use of imprisonment. There, we are on firm ground, attempting to per-
form a socially useful task by coercing behavior we believe to be in the
best interest of us all. When we go beyond that, and seek to punish for
the sake of punishment, we transcend both our abilities and our roles.
Retribution and just deserts is the role of the gods, not of the Justice
Department. Deterrence is our task, and punishment that exceeds the
drafted. It appears to represent a classic case of the tail, whose affliction we are
powerless to remedy, wagging the entire dog, which might otherwise be salvagable. See,
e g., S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), which, in its initial formulation, instructed the
sentencing judge to consider the defendant's education, vocational skills, relevant mental
or emotional condition, previous employment record, family ties and responsibilities, and
community ties-all of which might indicate the extent to which the defendant would be
receptive to meaningful nonimprisonment sanctions. The proposed bill has subsequently
been amended to specifically provide that such factors should not be considered by the
sentencing judge.
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deterrence function is a dangerous fiction that should be indulged in
only by the omniscient, the wicked or the foolish.39
E. A Caveat on Retribution
I am uncomfortable in criticizing the retributionists because their
approach has some plausibility as applied to many violent crimes and
criminals. Deterrence is of admittedly limited use in controlling many
such crimes, and the broad array of nonimprisonment sanctions which
are effective in dealing with many white-collar criminals is not likely to
work. While all such defendants are usually in dire need of meaningful
vocational rehabilitation, the fact that such programs have so low a
success rate militates against use of the imprisonment sanction to
fulfill a rehabilitative purpose. And, although incapacitation of persons
insensitive to deterrence would be a more legitimate purpose of the in-
carceration sanction, as applied it is suspect both because it punishes
for crimes that have not yet been committed; and because we simply
lack the ability to accurately ascertain who should be incapacitated
and, as a consequence, usually err on the side of including too broad a
percentage of the convicted population in the category. Thus, as is so
often the plight of the parent with a recalcitrant child, out of frustra-
tion we are left with no plausible recourse.
If the retributionists would limit their scope to those crimes and
criminals incapable of being effectively handled in any more construc-
tive manner and recognize it as a sanction derived from the utter
frustration of being unable to rationally deal with a severe problem,
they would be on solid-if not entirely justifiable-ground: Not con-
tent to leave well enough alone, however, the retributionists have
sought to extend their theories uniformly across the criminal law field.
And, in that manner, they demand equal treatment for criminals who
are indeed different and with whom we are capable of dealing ration-
ally and effectively by resorting to more humane and less costly sanc-
tions. In the name of equality, the retributionists are willing to throw
out the baby with the bath water. I am not. Punishment for the sake of
punishment should be resorted to, if at all, only when no constructive
alternatives are available. It should not be uniformly applied when un-
necessary or, as is so often the case, when actually counterproductive.
39. The best, and most persuasive, argument for adoption of a retributive sentencing
model is that of Professor von Hirsch. See note 14 supra. For a thorough and scholarly
refutation of Professor von Hirsch's arguments, see Coffee, The Repressed Issues of
Sentencing: Accountability, Predictability, and Equality in the Era of the Sentencing
Commission, 66 GEO. L.J. 975, 1076-80, 1093-99 (1978).
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III. ALTERNATIVES TO IMPRISONMENT
The basic premise of this article is the belief that many criminals
can be effectively deterred by the imposition of meaningful sanctions;
and that there are available a broad array of nonimprisonment sanc-
tions which will achieve the desired deterrent effect with far less cost
to society and less damage to the convicted felon. Moreover, these
sanctions can be made sufficiently meaningful and deleterious to con-
vince society that the convicted person is being justly dealt with and is
not "beating the rap" because of his wealth, status or influential posi-
tion. The latter factor is important, since no society can long endure if
the majority of its members perceive, whether rightly or not, that its
most favored members are above the law. That is undoubtedly why it
is often thought necessary to imprison politicians who abuse their posi-
tions of trust even though exposure and removal from office is most
probably sufficient to fulfill a pure deterrent function.4  If the latter ad-
mission smacks of "retribution" it is a limited type of retribution, not
intended to punish for the sake of punishment, but to punish for the
broader deterrent purpose of convincing all that none among us is
above the law, and that rich and poor, influential and unknown will
alike be held accountable for their transgressions. Thus, the alter-
natives to imprisonment we select must serve the dual purpose of ac-
tually deterring those who might be inclined to and who are in a posi-
tion to commit the types of crimes we seek to limit and, additionally, of
persuading all other members of society that the sanction is truly
meaningful. While that may seem a tall order, imaginative use and
publicizing of the nonimprisonment sanctions can fulfill that dual
burden.
The traditional alternatives to imprisonment have been probation
and fines. Neither sanction, as normally used, has fulfilled the above
dual function. Most people-both those whom we seek to deter and
those whose sense of justice we wish to satisfy-perceive probation as
no sanction whatsoever, often viewing it as "simply 'reporting' to a
40. If a person is sufficiently well known, and his conviction sufficiently publicized,
the onus that attaches may even fulfill a true retributive function, since the shame and
embarrassment may be as severe punishment as a jail sentence imposed upon one whose
life-style is not dramatically altered by the fact of imprisonment. As a young lawyer
representing indigent drug addicts I was often amazed at how lightly some of my less suc-
cessful clients treated imposition of an imprisonment sentence, knowing full well that the
prison "underground" would enable them to continue their drug addiction while imprisoned
and that, in many other respects, they would find their lives considerably less burden-
some. See Bridges, Gandy & Jorgensen, The Case for Creative Restitution in Corrections,
43 FEDERAL PROBATION 28 (1979) ("Incarceration, for many, is actually less harsh than
hustling the unsafe streets of the inner city") [hereinafter cited as The Case for Creative
Restitution].
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probation officer."'" Far too frequently that is an accurate observation,
since the swollen caseloads of probation workers often preclude them
even from making meaningful checks on the activities of those whom
they are charged with supervising. Similarly, fines are meaningless
when assessed against those unable to pay and against those whose
wealth makes the penal consequences so slight as to constitute no
more than a minor nuisance. Thus, whether a flat stipulated fine in
fact constitutes a meaningful sanction in a particular case is pure
happenstance. There is little we can do to effectively put teeth in pro-
bation, and it is recommended that its use be either greatly curtailed
or completely eliminated. Fines, however, offer a great deal more
potential, especially if coupled with other sanctions which are both
more meaningful to the convicted person and more visible and onerous
appearing to the public. Here, only a bit more imagination and
legislative and judicial cooperation can provide meaningful alternatives
to imprisonment that fulfill both the desired deterrent and public
perception goals.
Fines, for example, need not be set in flat amounts or limited to cer-
tain flat sum ranges-ie., a fine of from $1,000 to $10,000 for each
count of the indictment. So structured, the fine is usually so op-
pressive and unlikely of collection as to be meaningless, or so light as
to have little direct or collateral deterrent effect. Fines might better
be set on a graduated percentage scale of the defendant's net worth
and operate as an automatic lien against his assets. Thus, for a par-
ticular offense it would be possible to impose a fine equal to twenty
percent of the net worth of an embezzler whose assets are less than
$10,000 and as much as ninety percent of the net worth of an
embezzler whose assets exceed $1,000,000. Such a fine would, in both
instances, be meaningful in that it would be assessed against assets
which could be levied upon and would represent a sizeable percentage
of the felon's assets. If the defendant has no or very limited assets, but
does have a job, the fine can be a percentage of his monthly salary for
a definite future period, again with the percentage increasing depend-
ing upon the amount of the monthly salary. If the defendant loses his
employment through no fault of his own, alternative nonimprisonment
sanctions can be imposed. If, however, the defendant attempts to avoid
the fine by voluntarily terminating his employment, or by intentionally
committing acts that lead to his dismissal, he could be compelled to
serve the remainder of the sentence in jail. Used in these, and many
other, manners, fines have vast potential as meaningful punishments
quite likely to deter many types of white-collar crimes, whether used
41. Id.
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as the sole punishment or coupled with other nonimprisonment sanc-
tions.
Another sanction that has great potential with many persons con-
victed of crimes is deprivation of leisure time, especially when coupled
with a work or service requirement. For example, an individual could
be sentenced to report to a detention center from 5:00 p.m. to 11:00
p.m. each evening and for much longer periods on Saturdays and Sun-
days so that during the period of his sentence he will not be able to
socialize with friends, golf, bowl, read, watch television or otherwise
participate in the numerous leisure-time activities that make life en-
joyable. Preferably, he could also be assigned work activities beneficial
to the community during the same hours. The work activities could
make use of the defendant's talents if there is a need for them, or
could be of a nature the defendant would find somewhat demeaning or
which would expose him to embarrassment among his peers. For exam-
ple, a doctor convicted of medicare fraud might be assigned to spend
his leisure time providing free medical care in a community that has no
doctor; or be assigned to work as an orderly in a hospital; or compelled
to sweep streets or paint park benches. Again, failure to perform the
assigned tasks would subject the defendant to having to serve the re-
mainder of his term in a prison facility."
Another sanction might be personal service restitution to the vic-
tims of crime. Defendants could be assigned to a labor pool and com-
pelled to perform chores-from cutting the grass to running er-
rands-for victims of crimes other than their own.43 In that manner,
one who has been victimized by a crime would receive some compensa-
tion-at little expense to the state-for his injury, and the state would
benefit from inflicting a meaningful punishment upon the defendant."
42. Those individuals who are deemed candidates for such nonimprisonment sanc-
tions could, at sentencing, even be given the choice of serving a specified sentence in jail
or a specific nonimprisonment alternative. At that time, it could be made clear that failure
to fulfill the alternative sanction would subject the defendant to serving the remainder of
his time in a prison facility.
43. Such services could also be offered to persons on fixed incomes, who would not
otherwise be able to afford them. Retired persons now qualify for rent or property tax
rebates and free or low cost meals in some jurisdictions, so providing them with tangible
home repair help does not constitute a quantitatively "great leap." For a study on the role
of private organizations in providing services in concert with correctional facilities, see
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONTRACTING FOR CORRECTIONAL SERVICES IN THE COMMUNITY (1978).
See also NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, COMMUNITY BASED CORRECTIONAL PRO-
GRAM (1971).
44. Where feasible, portions of any fines levied and collected that exceed ad-
ministrative costs could be given to crime victims to compensate them for their losses.
Since no such monies could be collected from most convicted felons, the fines collected
could be pooled and distributed equally among all crime victims.
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If the work is not done to the victim's reasonable satisfaction, the ef-
fort would not count as "good time" and the sentence could be extended.
If the defendant repeatedly fails to perform satisfactorily, he could be
compelled to complete his sentence in jail.
The alternatives to incarceration listed here barely scratch the sur-
face of those which, with serious thought, can be structured. They are
not intended to represent a complete listing, but are merely il-
lustrative of the available alternatives."5 Obviously, not all convicted
criminals are good candidates for such alternatives to imprisonment.
Many such persons, however, can be effectively punished without totally
removing them from society; and, in the process, they can be assigned
constructive tasks and not simply "warehoused" at considerable ex-
pense to the already overburdened taxpayer. Merely because there
presently exist no truly meaningful alternative punishments for all
convicted felons is no reason to ignore the fact that for many, including
45. Judges from coast to coast-dissatisfied with the traditional alternatives or pro-
bation or incarceration-have begun structuring a broad and innovative array of non-
imprisonment sanctions for use in particular cases. For an evaluation and summary of
alternatives to incarceration, see LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEPT OF JUSTICE, INSTEAD OF JAIL (1977); LAw ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION,
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ALTERNATIVES TO INSTITUTIONALIZATION (1979) (definitive bibliography).
Glimpses of this practice frequently surface in reported decisions and news articles.
See, e.g., Albuquerque Journal, May 27, 1978, at A-8 (describing a sentence by District
Judge James Maloney). Judge Maloney sentenced three young men convicted of a $1.5
million arson arising out of a dispute between their family and a lumber company to pay-
ment of forty percent of their gross salaries over the next four years plus a one day per
week work obligation at the University of New Mexico's burn and trauma unit. The
payments-which represent substantial sums for the youths who earn between $4 and
$7.50 per hour-should be much more punitive than court-ordered restitutionary sums of
such magnitude as to be uncollectable. Cambria County, Pennsylvania Common Pleas
Judge Joseph F. O'Kicki has made a practice of rendering innovative work-related
sentences. For his efforts, the local newspaper has opposed his current retention election,
stating that this hard-working, inventive and sensitive judge is "soft on crime." For a
more formalized discussion of one type of alternative, see The Case for Creative Restitu-
tion, note 40 supra.
Some experience with alternatives to institutionalization has been gained from the
development of effective community juvenile programs. See generally NATIONAL IN-
STITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, COMMUNITY BASED CORRECTIONAL PROGRAMS: MODELS AND
PRACTICES (1974). One small Allegheny County, Pennsylvania community-Kennedy
Township-has created an entire alternative system for handling juvenile offenders outside
the court system, and has processed an average of one hundred young offenders annually
during each of the past four years. The offenders, who are permitted to work off fines and
penalties at a rate of two dollars per hour, paint, clean and maintain township property
and perform needed clerical services. An offender must opt for inclusion into the program
as an alternative to more formal sanctions imposed by Juvenile Court, and the program is
buttressed with tutorial services and guidance counseling. For a description of this pro-
gram, which is operated without outside funds, see Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Nov. 5, 1979.
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the large majority of white-collar criminals, these sanctions are both
punitive and constructive, in that they deter crime and fulfill commun-
ity needs without destroying the economic usefulness of the defendant
and without the huge direct and collateral costs incurred by imprison-
ment. To continue to ignore such potential solutions while vocally
espousing the populist threat to lock-up political and business criminals
may itself be consumer fraud of a criminal dimension.
A. The "Its's Nice, But Can't be Done" Syndrome
The most frequently encountered reaction to the proposals for alter-
native sanctions is that they cannot be effectively implemented -that
it would require so large an administrative and supervisory force as to
be economically and logistically impracticable. While that "spectre" is
likely to remain until large-scale implementation is attempted, it is
believed to be largely illusory." Initially, the alternatives to imprison-
ment can only work with those who are-or are perceived to be-sen-
sitive to deterrence factors. Many convicted felons, including those
described earlier by Judge Bazelon, 7 are not easily, if at all, deterred
by increasingly harsher and more repressive sanctions. They are not
responsive to deterrence measures for a complex multitude of reasons,
including the uncomfortable fact that often the most repressive
measures we are willing to mount are not materially worse than their
already harsh, unpromising and unfulfilling existences." That social
problem, as reprehensible as it may be and as in need of revamping as
it undoubtedly is, cannot be permitted to drag down to the lowest com-
mon denominator the entire sentencing process. We must accept the
fact that there are those whom, by a creative, humane and pragmatic
46. If relatively small communities with limited resources can structure effective
alternative programs, it seems almost axiomatic that concerted efforts by state and
federal governments to implement similar broader-based programs have an excellent
chance of succeeding. Interestingly, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration only
"tipped its hat" to the concept of deriving alternatives to incarceration. Instead, LEAA
emphasized bricks and hardware, with billions of dollars being spent on computers, elec-
tronic equipment and various surveillance devices. THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY, March 19,
1980, at 323.
47. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
48. An interview with a prison counselor at a local prison points out how easy it
often is for prisoners to continue drug habits while incarcerated and how, for many, im-
prisonment does not materially alter their normal existence. He concluded that some
prisoners continue to be involved in criminal activity because the lack of freedom and the
violence of the prison environment simply do not bother them. See Duquesne Duke,
Oct. 4, 1979, at 9. A virtually identical statement was contained in another part of the
former prisoner's letter to a fellow member of the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentenc-
ing quoted in part at note 18 supra.
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sentencing policy, we can effectively control without destroying and
others with whom, at least at the present time, we lack the ability to
more rationally deal. For those who are perceived to be sensitive to
punishment, the spectre of ultimate imprisonment if they fall off the
nonimprisonment sanction wagon will in and of itself largely be suffi-
cient to assure compliance with truly meaningful nonimprisonment
sanctions. If, for example, a doctor or lawyer convicted of insurance
fraud is clearly apprised of the fact that a failure to pay a large
graduated fine based upon net worth or income and to perform needed
community services in a workmanlike and diligent manner will result
in hard time imprisonment, compliance will quite likely be the rule and
noncompliance the exception. Thus, it is not likely that completion of
performance of assigned duties will require close and constant supervi-
sion but instead could be accomplished by the routine logging of
payments and the filing of work completion reports by the recipients
of the mandated services. These could be administratively handled in
central offices with a minimum of personnel.
What will undoubtedly take more time and creative effort is the
structuring of a sufficient range of needed services to be assigned to
those convicted of crimes so that the sentencing judge can select the
appropriate punishment from a list of tasks the convicted person is
capable of effectively performing. But this too is a not unmanageable
task. Government bureau heads could be instructed to report to a cen-
tral agency needed tasks that cannot be performed by available work
staff or which is routinely subcontracted to nongovernment personnel.
And, groups such as the Society of Friends and the Council of
Churches-which have long worked toward more humane sentencing
policies-could be enlisted to provide that agency with sufficiently
supervised work alternatives to keep large numbers of convicted per-
sons productively busy during what would be their leisure time.
Moreover, victims of crimes and those persons living on extremely low
incomes could be instructed to make their service needs known to such
an agency, and those needs and the available skills could be matched
by computers. And, even if there were no useful tasks that a deter-
rable convicted felon could be assigned, "warehousing" him for a few
hours every evening and on weekends in a local detention
center-thereby depriving him of his leisure time without the severe
direct and collateral economic disruption occasioned by actual im-
prisonment- would serve to deter without the huge social and
material costs of imprisonment. I find it difficult to believe that such
measures are logistically impracticable or even as expensive as just
the direct costs of imprisonment. And, when the indirect costs of im-
prisonment are factored in, the cost of these more humane yet true
punishments are almost certain to be considerably lower. If this is in
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fact true, and if the deterrent effect of their use is the same as or similar
to incarceration, failure to use nonimprisonment sentencing alter-
natives simply cannot be supported on either logical or moral grounds.
There is a high probability that, with less cost and effort than is
presently being expended on the totally wasteful warehousing of con-
victed felons, large numbers of persons can be productively yet effec-
tively punished for their transgressions. It is time for the "it can't be
done" school to step aside so that creative, innovative penologists can
at long last set about to move criminal sentencing into the twentieth
century.
B. Who Should Be the Recipients of Nonimprisonment
Alternatives?
Meaningful, carefully constructed alternatives to the imprisonment
sanction can fulfill the legitimate societal goal of deterring crime in
some, but most certainly not all, cases. Thus, it is necessary to isolate
those criminals and offenses to whom such sanctions can safely and ef-
fectively be given. It is here that the cries of unequal treatment and
elitism are most likely to be heard, and it is those condemnations
which have to be rationally and effectively defused if legislators, the
judiciary and the public are to accept a more humane approach to
sentencing.
The use of nonimprisonment alternatives when dealing with purely
economic crime-especially when committed by those who abuse the
public trust or take advantage of their economically powerful posi-
tions - is both the most logical and yet the most incendiary starting
point. It is logical that nonimprisonment sanctions be used 'when deal-
ing with such felons because they usually have the most to lose by im-
position of meaningful graduated fines; have the most to offer in the
way of useful skills that can be turned to a beneficial public purpose;
and are the individuals who, since they would suffer the most direct
and collateral consequences of imprisonment, are the most likely to
fulfill the alternative sanctions with a minimum of supervision and a
maximum of public benefit. Moreover, it is quite probable that others
in a position to commmit similar crimes will quickly become aware of
the consistent use of such sanctions, and find them to have as much or
more deterrent effect as the sporadic use of rather limited jail
sentences. 9 It is an incendiary starting point in that such felons are
49. For many criminals, including the great bulk of those who commit crimes that
have to be carefully thought out in advance and which do not result from instant provoca-
tions, the fear of a relatively certain sanction is probably a more meaningful deterrent
than the remote possibility of a prison sentence. It is common knowledge that few first of-
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usually of a somewhat "higher profile" than the average street
criminal and a failure to imprison could give renewed impetus to the
belief that people of wealth and status can commit crime with relative
impunity. If in fact the sanction is severe, and if it does serve the
necessary deterrent function as well as imprisonment, the government
should not buckle to potential public misconceptions, but should in-
stead attempt to convince the public that the punishments are truly
meaningful as applied and that use of the imprisonment sanction is not
only unnecessary but, since it is harsher than required to fulfill socie-
ty's needs, morally reprehensible. Moreover, the public should be made
aware that the punishment is being achieved at no or a very low cost
to them, and indeed that society may in fact derive an economic
benefit as a result of the sanction, while the imprisonment alternative
causes the already harmed public to foot the bill for still more direct
and indirect economic costs.' If the public can be made aware that the
judicial system is in fact inflicting a meaningful punishment upon the
felon, that it is at the same time lessening the likelihood of the crime's
repetition to the same extent as would be the case if the felon were
imprisoned, and that in the process it is saving the taxpayers several
tens of thousands of dollars in each case, it is probable that the bulk of
fenders who do not inflict significant personal injury upon a victim are imprisoned. Thus,
many economic criminals proceed on their illicit paths secure in the belief that, if caught,
they will receive no meaningful sanction. We can, without severely damaging the defen-
dant and at an acceptable governmental cost, impose meaningful nonimprisonment sanc-
tions upon virtually all first offenders, including those convicted of business crimes or
breaches of the public trust. The alternative would be to incarcerate all first of-
fenders-at prohibitive cost in new prison construction and prisoner maintenance-or to
incarcerate only those first offenders whose imprisonment would serve a "sure"special or
general deterrent function, which would result in treating white-collar criminals far more
harshly than street criminals. While the latter alternative has been recommended because
such criminals have had more societal benefits than have street criminals, it smacks more
of vengeance than of fulfilling a legitimate need and is not here condoned. It seems both
more humane and in keeping with the legitimate goals of society to use the imprisonment
sanction only when no legitimate and effective alternatives are available, and to use mean-
ingful nonimprisonment sanctions to achieve the desired deterrent effects.
50. Even when we have used the imprisonment sanction to punish "high profile"
political and economic criminals, we have not often placed them in institutions where they
rubbed shoulders with hardened street criminals, but have instead incarcerated them in
minimum security prisons. We have done this out of the realization that many such
criminals-such as former presidential counsel John Dean and former Attorney General
John Mitchell-would be subjected to such abuses from the general prison populations of
hard core institutions as to jeopardize their safety. Yet, the punishments inflicted were
perceived by many to be less than severe, and in effect many such individuals were pro-
vided with an opportunity to write highly profitable books at government expense. Heavy
fines and a requirement to perform time and energy consuming public services might well
have been a more severe sanction in such cases, and it is conceivable that the public
would have perceived this to be the case.
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these misconceptions will dissolve and the punishment will be accepted
as a reasonable and rational solution to an admitted problem. I am simply
not ready to concede that a properly informed public will demand of
any convicted person, including one of status or influence, more punish-
ment than is necessary to achieve the legitimate requirements of soci-
ety. And, to the extent some members of the public might desire to
punish an offender more severely than necessary simply to sate their
own hatreds, prejudices or jealousies, those desires should be ignored.
Economic criminals who are not in a position of influence or possessed
of wealth can also be safely dealt with by use of the nonincarceration
sanctions, even though their lack of status and money narrows the
range of available sentencing alternatives. The home repair cheat or
the "paper hanger," by way of illustration, while not likely to have a
sufficient net worth to make a graduated fine meaningful, may have
skills that can be put to productive public purposes; most likely has
leisure time activities that he would not relish having curtailed; and is
not an immediate threat to commit violent physical crimes upon other
members of society if in fact he does not truly alter his lawless
behavior. Thus, as to such persons, the further risk that his nonim-
prisonment causes is probably offset by the benefits to society of per-
mitting him to remain productive during the time he is being punished.
Moreover, since failure to fulfill the mandated alternative sanctions
could result in the actual imprisonment of such felons, and since such
persons are usually not fully equipped to deal with the harsh realities
of communal living with violent street criminals, there is a built-in in-
centive to fulfill the work sentence imposed and to abandon criminal
activity.5"
Another group of logical candiates for alternative sanctions are
those "street criminals" who have no history of violence and those
who, because of the paucity of their prior records or otherwise, would
fall into the "out" category on any applicable sentencing guideline grid.
Clearly, imposition of any type of meaningful nonimprisonment sanc-
tion upon convicted felons is preferable to the nonpunishment that is
so often the true effect of probation. 2 No convicted person should be
51. As indicated earlier, it is also easier to monitor the activities of such felons to
make sure that they do not again engage in similar crimes during their period of "alter-
native sanctions," since they usually have to advertise or "set the stage" for repetitions
of the activities that resulted in their conviction. Thus, while out of prison, they do not
create the same threat to society as is true of those disposed toward violent street crime.
52. Both present sentencing practices and those sentencing guidelines that have been
proposed do not provide for the incarceration of most first offenders, including many who
commit burglaries, robberies and other "street crimes." It makes far more sense to at
least attempt to impose nonimprisonment sanctions which could be meaningful upon such
felons than to let them off virtually scot free. One possible problem with our present
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given one or more "free crimes," and establishment of a broad range of
nonincarceration sanctions will encourage judges to sentence those
street criminals who are presently being released on probation or
given suspended sentences to more meaningful, yet not life-disruptive
and physically and emotionally damaging, sanctions. If for no other
reason, the ability to drive home to those whom we presently merely
slap on the wrist that crime is regarded seriously and will be dealt
with severely would warrant the creation of a readily available range of
nonimprisonment sanctions.
It is probable that many others who commit more violent crimes
could also be effectively deterred by use of nonimprisonment sanc-
tions. However, without increased ability to predict future behavior
and without adequate psychological testing, counseling and treatment
services available, I would not advocate extending the concept too far
at this time.
Beyond the above are the broad range of violent criminals we sim-
ply are not capable of dealing with, and who are impervious to all
acceptable deterrences including, in most instances, the threat or ac-
tuality of imprisonment. For lack of a better solution, I too would in-
carcerate such persons when convicted of serious crimes. Those felons,
however, should not be the norm by which all sentences are measured,
and their imprisonment should be recognized as a "non-solution"
resulting from the utter frustration of our own ineptitude in dealing
with a serious and frightening problem.
IV. CONCLUSION
Jails are deplorable places largely because we have used them to
house large numbers of people who pose real dangers to society and
with whom we have not yet learned to rationally deal. We cannot let
the practices spawned by that failure serve as the benchmark for the
whole sentencing process and, under the rubric of equal treatment,
subject those with whom we can effectively deal to unnecessary, ex-
pensive and counterproductive punishments.
With an increasing frequency innovative and creative judges,
dissatisfied with the traditional alternatives of imprisonment or proba-
sentencing policies is that we warn transgressors repeatedly, leading them to believe we
are not serious, and then suddenly impose the extremely harsh sanction of imprisonment.
Some street criminals might take the law more seriously if, from the outset, it attempted
to inflict meaningful sanctions. It must be admitted, however, that the first offender
street criminal is highly likely to fail to fulfill assigned nonimprisonment sanctions, and
would undoubtedly require very close-and expensive -supervision. Attempts to impose
such punishment, however, seem preferable to the "non-punishment" that all too frequently
is the real effect of probation. The increased use of trial diversionary programs un-
doubtedly reflects a limited governmental implementation of this thesis.
854 Vol. 18:823
1980 Sentencing Reform 855
tion, have structured sentences which, although punitive and serving a
deterrent function, do not unnecessarily degrade the criminal and
disrupt his life and the lives of those dependent upon him for support.
It is high time this practice be formalized so that definitive empirical
studies can be made to determine when this more humane and less
costly form of punishment can safely be used and whether its use
fulfills the legitimate need of our society to reduce crime. As the pros-
ecutorial focus shifts from the street criminal to the economic criminal
the choice of sanctions must also shift, or the crimes of society's pro-
tectors will become as severe as those of the criminals they pursue.

